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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina appeals from his conviction for first-degree 
murder challenging his conviction under a felony murder theory. In this appeal 
Pina requests a substantial change to Idaho's felony murder rule. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas 
Pina kidnapped Jesse Naranjo at gunpoint at a drug house. (Trial Tr., vol. 
ll,p.939,L.13-p.958,L.9;p.1004,L.11-p.l052,L.11;~0l.III,p.1151,L. 
8 - p. 1164, L. 14; p. 1263, L. 19 - p. 1265, L. 17.) In the house Pina, armed 
with a sawed-off shotgun, ordered Naranjo to his knees. (Trial Tr., voi. Ill, p. 
1164, L. 18-p.  1165, L. 22; p. 1206, L. 20-p.  1207, L. 15; p. 1214, L. 22-p.  
1217, L. 3.) Johnny Shores, who lived at the house, entered the room where 
Pina held Naranjo at gunpoint. (Trial Tr., vol. I l l ,  p. 1165, Ls. 8-25; p. 1217, L. 11 
- p. 1219, L. 20; p. 1275, L. 9 - p. 1284, L. 4.) Pina passed the shotgun to 
Shores. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1220, L. 15 - p. 1221, L. 12; p. 1284, L. 8 - p. 1286, 
L. 15.) 
Seeing an opportunity, Naranjo attempted to seize the shotgun while it 
was being passed by Pina to Shores. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1220, L. 15 - p. 1221, 
L. 12; p. 1286, Ls. 16-25.) The three men wrestled for the shotgun. (Trial Tr., 
VOI. II, p. 958, L. 22 - p. 960, L. 9; p. 1052, L. 23 - p. 1061, L. 2; VOI. Ill, p. 1166, 
L. I - p. 1167, L. 8; p. 1220, L. 15 - p. 1221, L. 12; p. 1286, L. 21 - p. 1299, L. 
14.) Eventually Shores secured the shotgun, and Naranjo attempted to flee 
through a back door. (Trial Tr., VOI. Ill, p. 1167, L. 9 - p. 1168, L. 13; p. 1287, L. 
4 - p. 1289, L. 7.) Shores, with the gun, followed Pina and Naranjo as they 
moved toward the back door, Pina hitting Naranjo as he tried to flee. (Trial Tr., 
vol. Ill, p. 1287, L. 18 - p. 1288, L. 14.) As Pina fought to prevent Naranjo from 
escaping through the back door, Shores shot Naranjo with the shotgun, killing 
him. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 366, L. 6 - p. 374, L. 15; p. 380, L. 22 - p. 388, L. 14; p. 
395, L. 15-p.444, L. 11; p.465, L.21 -p.495, L. 18; p. 500, L. 17-p.  513, L. 
9 ;~0 l . I I ,p .960,  L.7-p.963,L.  l i p .  1061,L. 1 8 - ~ . 1 0 6 4 , L . 8 ~ ~ 0 l . l i l , p .  1259, 
Ls. 11-15; p. 1288, L. 19-p. 1290, L. 11.) 
A grand jury indicted Pina for first degree felony murder. (R., vol. I, pp. 
17-18.) The matter proceeded to trial. (See generally, Trial Tr.) After the state 
rested Pina moved for acquittal, arguing that the evidence did not support the 
state's theory of felony murder because, he claimed, the evidence showed that 
Shores was acting independently of Pina. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1390, L. 15 - p. 
1394, L. 12; p. 1396, Ls. 9-25; see also p. 1400, L. 17 - p. 1402, L. 17; p. 1532, 
L. 5 - p. 1534, L. 3.) The state responded by arguing that, although Shores was 
not involved at the start of the kidnapping, the evidence showed he was acting in 
concert with Pina, and against Naranjo, once he became involved. (Trial Tr., vol. 
III,p. 1394, L. 1 4 - p .  1396, L .7 ;seealsop.  1398, L. 11 - p .  1400, L. 15; p. 
1534, L. 5 - p. 1535, L. 24.) The court took a brief recess, then denied the 
motion. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1397, Ls. 1-5; p. 1403, L. 2 - p. 1405, L. 9; p. 1407, 
Ls. 6-15; p. 1536, L. 21 - p. 1538, L. 25.) 
After the last evidence was presented, Pina temporarily refused to appear 
in court. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1607, L. 3 - p. 1613, L. 23.) He later informed the 
court, through the jail, that he would attend if he could represent himself. (Trial 
Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1616, L. 24 - p. 1617, L. 7.) The court denied the request as 
untimely. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1621, Ls. 3-20.) 
After the trial, the jury found Pina guilty. (R., vol. II, pp. 290-91.) The 
judge entered a judgment of conviction and Pina timely appealed. (R., vol. Ill, 
pp. 463-72.) 
ISSUES 
Pina states the issues on appeal as: 
1 The state failed to present any evidence to support a finding 
that Mr. Pina and Mr. Shores were acting in concert with one 
another when Mr. Shores killed Mr. Naranjo. Was Mr. Pina denied 
due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United State Constitution when he was convicted absent proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute 
the crime of felony murder? 
2. Regardless of whether Idaho's felony murder statute 
imposes felony murder liability under either an agency theory or a 
proximate cause theory, did the district court err when it gave the 
jury instructions which allowed the jurors to convict Mr. Pina under 
a strict liability theory? 
3. Did the district court err when, without any inquiry into the 
merit of the reason for discharge, the quality of counsel's 
representation prior to the request, whether any disruptive effect 
would result from the discharge, the rationale for the timing of the 
request, the complexity and stage of the proceedings, and any prior 
requests by the defendant to discharge counsel it denied his mid- 
trial motion to proceed pro se? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 12.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Do Pina's claims of instructional error and insufficient evidence fail 
because Pina's central premise -that a required element of felony murder is that 
the killing had to be committed by either the defendant himself or a co-felon - is 
without merit? 
2. Has Pina failed to show error in the district court's determination that his 
request to represent himself, made just before the close of presentation of 
evidence, was untimely? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Pina Has Failed To Show Either Instructional Error Or Insufficient Evidence 
Because He Is Guilty Of Felony Murder For The Killing Of Jesse Naranio During 
The Course Of A Kidnapping Even if Shores Was Not A Direct Participant In The 
Kidnapping 
A. Introduction 
The evidence presented at trial showed that Pina kidnapped Jesse 
Naranjo, and that Shores shot Naranjo while Naranjo was trying to escape. Pina 
claims both instructional error and insufficient evidence based on his assertion 
that Idaho law requires that the state prove that Shores was actually a participant 
in the kidnapping, and not merely that the killing happened in the course of the 
kidnapping performed by Pina. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-34.) Specifically, he 
argues that the jury should have been instructed that an element of felony 
murder was that the killer had to be either the defendant or a co-felon 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 29-34), and that the evidence does not support a 
conclusion that Shores participated in the kidnapping (Appellant's brief, pp. 13- 
29). These arguments fail because Idaho's felony murder law applies to all 
killings committed during the course of a felony, not just to killings committed by 
the defendant or those acting "in concert with or in furtherance of' the underlying 
felony. In addition, even if Pina were correct on the law, and Idaho's felony 
murder rule applied only to killings committed by actual participants in the 
underlying felony, the jury could reasonably have concluded from the evidence 
that Shores shot Naranjo to prevent him from escaping, making Shores a 
participant in the kidnapping. 
B. Standard of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 285-86, 77 P.3d 956, 974-75 (2003); 
State v. Reves, 121 ldaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). The appellate 
court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the 
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Hovle, 140 ldaho 679, 683- 
84, 99 P.3d 1069, 1073-74 (2004) (plurality); State v. Knutson, 121 ldaho 101, 
104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Decker, 108 ldaho 683, 684, 
701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985). 
In determining if the evidence is substantial and competent, it will be 
considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Miller, 131 
ldaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Knutson, 121 ldaho 
101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991). Substantial evidence is present 
when a "reasonable mind" could conclude that guilt was proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Hovle, 140 ldaho 679, 683-84, 99 P.3d 1069, 1073- 
74 (2004) (plurality). 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law given free review. State v. 
Nickerson, 121 ldaho 925,927, 828 P.2d 1330,1332 (Ct. App. 1992). 
C. Idaho's Felony Murder Law Applies To All Killings Committed Durina The 
Course Of A Felony, Not Just To Killings Committed Bv The Defendant Or 
Those Actinq "In Concert With Or In Furtherance Of' The Underlying 
FelonV 
Contrary to Pina's argument, Idaho's felony murder law does not require 
that the person committing the killing be a participant in the underlying felony. 
Instead, ldaho law requires only that the killing be in the course of the underlying 
felony. 
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the 
statute. State v. Schwartz, 139 ldaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). It is a 
well established principle of statutory interpretation that "the clearly expressed 
intent of the legislature must be given effect, thus leaving no occasion for 
construction where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous." State v. 
McCoy, 128 ldaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 (1996) (citations omitted). 
In Idaho, murder is "the unlawful killing of a human being ... with malice 
aforethought ...." I.C. 5 18-4001. Malice is implied "when no considerable 
provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an 
abandoned and malignant heart." I.C. 5 18-4002. "Any murder committed in the 
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, ... kidnapping ..., is murder of the first 
degree." I.C. 5 18-4003(d). These statutes have been interpreted to mean that, 
in the case of felony murder, the intent to commit the underlying felony 
substitutes for the malice element of murder. State v. Scroaains, 110 ldaho 380, 
386, 716 P.2d 11 52, 11 58 (1 985) ("In a prosecution for felony-murder, the state 
is relieved of the burden of proving that a defendant had the specific intent to kill 
and instead need only prove that all individuals charged as principles had the 
specific intent to commit the predicate felony."); State v. Windsor, 110 ldaho 
410, 419, 716 P.2d 1182, 1191 (1985) ("Under [Idaho's felony murder statute], a 
defendant who participates in a felony can be held liable for the death of any 
person killed during the commission of the felony, regardless of the individual 
defendant's intent that a death occur."); see also State v. Paradis, 106 ldaho 117, 
125, 676 P.2d 31, 39 (1983) ("a defendant who participates in a robbery can be 
held liable for the death of any person killed during the commission of that 
robbery, regardless of the individual defendant's intent that a death occur"). 
Thus, under the plain language of the statute, the "killing of a human being" 
"committed in the perpetration of ... kidnapping" is felony murder. 
Pina argues, citing authority from other jurisdictions, that the "in the 
perpetration of' language of the ldaho felony murder statute requires that the 
killing have been committed by an accomplice to the felony. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 13-25.) ldaho courts, however, have consistently interpreted the "in 
perpetration of' language more broadly. 
ldaho Courts have held that a killing is committed in the perpetration of an 
underlying felony if that killing "was part of a stream of events." State v. Fetterly, 
109 ldaho 766, 771-72, 710 P.2d 1202, 1207-08 (1985); see also State v. Pratt, 
125 ldaho 546, 558, 873 P.2d 800, 812 (1993) (killing was "part of a stream of 
events," and therefore felony murder, even though committed after the felony 
was complete). Idaho's felony murder rule requires only that the felony and the 
murder "were all part of the same general occurrence." State v. Cheatham, 134 
ldaho 565, 571, 6 P.3d 815, 821 (2000). 
Likewise, in State v. McLeskey 138 ldaho 691, 69 P.3d 11 1 (2003), the 
ldaho Supreme Court rejected an argument that the defendant was improperly 
charged with the firearm enhancement of I.C. § 19-2520 in relation to a burgiary 
where the evidence indicated he fired the gun while fleeing the premises after the 
burglary. The court reasoned he was properly charged, applying the "stream of 
events" rationale applicable to felony murder. As part of its analysis the court 
stated, "The phrase 'in the perpetration of a crime in ldaho Code § 18-4003(d) is 
synonymous with the words 'while committing' a crime in ldaho Code 3 19-2520." 
In State v. Hokenson, 96 ldaho 283, 527 P.2d 487 (1974), the ldaho 
Supreme Court addressed whether Hokenson was properly convicted of felony 
murder where a police officer was killed trying to disarm a home-made bomb 
Hokenson used in an attempted robbery, even though Hokenson himself had 
been arrested before that time. Concluding he was liable, the ldaho Supreme 
Court stated, "A person is criminally liable for the natural and probable 
consequences of his unlawful acts as well as unlawful forces he set in motion 
during the commission of an unlawful act." at 288, 527 P.2d at 492. 
Although these cases did not involve the specific claim that the killing was 
not done by a co-felon, the general rule as articulated in these cases applies to 
that claim. The ldaho Supreme Court has stated that defendants are responsible 
for killings that occur in the "stream of events" of the felony, even after the felony 
has been completed; that "in the perpetration of' as used in the felony murder 
statute is synonymous with 'khile committing"; and that a defendant is 
responsible for a death caused by the unlawful forces he has set in motion. 
Thus, ldaho courts have already rejected arguments that the killing need further 
the underlying purpose of the felony or the intent or interests of the participants in 
the felony. 
Here the killing was clearly in the stream of events, was done while Pina 
was committing the felony, and was caused by unlawful forces Pina set in 
motion. To limit his liability under the facts of this case would be to restrict 
liability contrary to existing authority. The ldaho cases clearly reject a limited or 
narrow reading of the "in the perpetration of' language of the felony murder rule. 
This reading of ldaho law and precedent is also consistent with precedent 
from other states. For example, in Miers v. State, 251 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1952), Miers and an accomplice went into a business to rob it. The victim 
struggled with Miers and was shot and killed. Miers testified that the victim had 
shot himself on accident after a scuffle for Miers' gun. The court considered, in 
relation to a jury instruction question, whether Miers' testimony presented an 
actual defense to felony murder. The court stated: 
"The whole question here is one of causal connection. If the 
appellant here set in motion the cause which occasioned the death 
of the deceased, we hold it to be a sound doctrine that he would be 
as culpable as if he had done the deed with his own hands." 
w, 251 S.W.2d at 408 (quoting Taylor v. State, 55 S.W. 961, 964 (1900) 
(holding defendant responsible for death of bystander where a different 
bystander intervened to prevent robbery and a shootout ensued, regardless of 
who actually shot the deceased)). Because Miers had "set in motion the cause 
which occasioned the death of the deceased," his testimony that the victim 
accidentally shot himself did not provide a defense. Mi-ers, 251 S.W.2d at 408. 
Illinois courts have also adopted the proximate cause standard for felony 
murder.' People v. Hudson, 856 N.E.2d 1078, 1083-84 (111. 2006). In People v. 
Loweiy, 687 N.E.2d 973 (111. 1997), the Supreme Court of Illinois declined the 
same proposition put forth by Pina: to switch from the proximate cause theory of 
felony murder to the agency theory. Although recognizing that a majority of 
jurisdictions follow the agency theory, the court rejected the agency theory. The 
court reasoned that "[c]ausal relation is the universal factor common to all legal 
liability." at 976. It is thus "consistent with reason and sound public policy to 
hold that when a felon's attempt to commit a forcible felony sets in motion a chain 
of events which were or should have been within his contemplation when the 
motion was initiated, he should be held responsible for any death which by direct 
and almost inevitable sequence results from the initial criminal act." Id.; see also 
Hudson, 856 N.E.2d at 1084. "Moreover, we believe that the intent behind the 
felony-murder doctrine would be thwarted if we did not hold felons responsible for 
the foreseeable consequences of their actions." Loweiy, 687 N.E.2d at 976. 
Thus, a defendant is responsible for a death caused by the victim's forcible 
resistance of the crime. Hudson, 856 N.E.2d at 1084. 
' Pina seems to suggest that the adoption of the proximate cause theory of felony 
murder in Illinois was by statute. (Appellant's brief, p. 21.) It appears, however, 
that the lllinois legislature actually clarified in the statutory language what was 
already the law of the state as found in pre-existing case-law. People v. Allen, 
309 N.E.2d 544 (111. 1974) (noting that the comments to the felony murder statute 
cite to People v. Pavne, 194 N.E. 539 (Ill. 1935), a case holding that the felony 
murder rule applied where the killing was actually committed by the victim while 
resisting the crime). 
Finally, Indiana's felony murder statute provides that a defendant is guilty 
of felony murder if he "kills another human being while committing" certain 
enumerated felonies. Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 269-70 (Ind. 2000) 
(quoting lnd. Code § 35-42-1-1). The court concluded this language "does not 
restrict the felony murder provision only to instances in which the felon is the 
killer, but may also apply equally when, in committing any of the designated 
felonies, the felon contributes to the death of any person." Jenkins, 726 N.E.2d 
at 269. Thus, a defendant is guilty if the defendant's conduct was the "mediate 
or immediate cause of the death." Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
Although ldaho has not explicitly rejected the agency theory for felony 
murde? it has expressly adopted the proximate cause theory of liability. In 
v. Hokenson, 96 ldaho 283, 527 P.2d 487 (1974), Hokenson used a home-made 
bomb in a r~bbery .~  He was arrested and police seized the bomb. There was 
some dispute in the evidence about events immediately before the bomb went off 
(including whether the officer pulled wires out of the bomb in an attempt to 
Pina argues that the agency theory was part of the common law and therefore 
implicitly adopted in ldaho. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-20.) This argument may not 
be accurate, however, as the common law felony murder rule developed merely 
as a way of distinguishing between murder and manslaughter by imputing malice 
to someone who himself killed another in the course of a felony, and thus was 
merely a rule for imputing a mental state, not any particular act, to the defendant. 
See Simon, Whose Crime Is It Anyway?: Liability For The Lethal Acts Of 
Nonparticipants In The Felony, 71 U.Detroit Mercy L.Rev 223, 225-26 (Winter 
1994) (and relevant footnotes). See also People v. Podolski, 52 N.W.2d 201 
(Mich. 1952) (case was "within the principles of the common law, notwithstanding 
the fact that the fatal bullet was fired by an officer" instead of a co-felon). 
Hokenson was convicted under a reckless murder statute that was in effect for 
only a short period of time, had been repealed by the time the decision was 
issued in that case, and is not currently in Idaho's statutes. 
disarm it), but it was clear that the bomb did explode and killed an officer. In 
addressing whether Hokenson's conduct constituted felony murder, the court 
stated: "The fact [Hokenson] was met by resistance on the part of his intended 
victim, and in fact placed under arrest, does not release him from the final 
consequences of his act." && at 288, 527 P.2d at 492 (emphasis added). 
Rather, a defendant "is criminally liable for the natural and probable 
consequences of his unlawful acts as well as unlawful forces he set in motion 
during the commission of an unlawful act." && 
In this case, Pina kidnapped Jesse Naranjo and held him by use of a 
sawed-off shotgun. Naranjo was ultimately killed with the same gun while he 
sought to escape the kidnapping initiated by Pina. Pina seeks to insulate himself 
from the "natural and probable consequences" of his unlawful acts and the 
unlawful forces he set in motion by claiming that Shores, who actually pulled the 
trigger, was not also a kidnapper. Although such a position has support in the 
laws of other jurisdictions, it is unsupported by the laws of ldaho and the 
precedents of its courts. ldaho has chosen to make defendants responsible for 
deaths caused by the defendant's crime, not just the deaths caused by the 
defendant's partners in that crime. Because Pina's suggested agency theory of 
felony murder is inconsistent with existing ldaho law, he has failed to show error, 
either in the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction or in the alleged 
failure of the jury instructions to include his theory. 
D. The Evidence Supports The Verdict Even If The Law Did Require That 
The Killinq Be Committed By Someone Acting In Concert With Pina 
Because it was not required under Idaho's felony murder statute that the 
state prove Shores was a co-kidnapper with Pina, Pina's claim the evidence was 
insufficient on this point is irrelevant. Even if this Court should adopt the agency 
theory of felony murder, however, Pina has failed to show that he is entitled to an 
acquittal. Pina argues that the evidence shows the actual shooter, Shores, was 
not a participant in the kidnapping mostly because Shores said he was not. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 25-29.) Looking at Shores' actions, however, especially 
the act of shooting Naranjo as Naranjo was about to make good his escape from 
the kidnapping, shows that the jury had more than sufficient evidence that 
Shores had joined the kidnapping and in fact shot Naranjo to prevent his escape. 
The evidence indicated that Shores disliked Naranjo. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 
1158, L. 2 2 - p .  1160, L. 7; vol. Ill, p. 1358, L. 2 3 - p .  1360, L. 20.) It also 
indicated that the gun Pina used had been previously stolen and prepared at the 
house (sawn off) prior to the events in question. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 541, L. 8 - p. 
543, L. 3; vol. 11, p. 717, L. 16 - p. 723, L. 5.) The evidence established that 
Shores asked for, and Pina handed him, the gun in the course of the kidnapping. 
(Trial Tr., vol. 111, p. 1284, L. 8 - p. 1286, L. 15.) Pina, apparently, ordered 
Naranjo in Spanish to kiss Shores' feet and Shores at that time kicked Naranjo in 
the face. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1165, L. 8 - p. 1166, L. 3.) While Shores held the 
gun, Pina beat Naranjo. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1287, L. 4 - p. 1288, L. 6.) Finally, 
Shores shot Naranjo as Naranjo was on the verge of escaping. (Trial Tr., vol. 11, 
p.958, L.22-p.963,  L. 1; p. 1061, L.18-p.  1064, L.8;vol. III,p. 1167, L . 9 -  
p.1168,L.13;p.1184,L.12-p. 1185,L.2;p.1259,L~.11-15;p.1288,L.1Q- 
p. 1290, L. 11; p. 1374, L. 10 - p. 1375, L. 24.) This act, shooting Naranjo to 
prevent his escape, is directly contrary to Shores' denial that he was part of the 
kidnapping. (See Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1536, L. 21 - p. 1538, L. 25.) 
Because the evidence indicated that Shores shot Naranjo to prevent his 
escape from the kidnapping, the jury could reasonably conclude that Shores was, 
in fact, a kidnapper with Pina. Thus, as co-felons, both would be responsible for 
the felony murder of Naranjo even if this Court should adopt the agency theory of 
felony murder as proposed by Pina. 
E. Pina Has Failed To Show Anv Error In The Jurv Instructions 
Pina argues that the jury instructions were erroneous for two reasons. 
First, Pina argues that the jury instructions failed to set forth the agency theory 
espoused by Pina both below and on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp. 31-33.) As 
set forth above, ldaho does not recognize the agency theory. The trial court's 
refusal to instruct on a matter that is not an accurate statement of the law in 
ldaho was not error. State v. Johns, 112 ldaho 873, 881, 736 P.2d 1327, 1335 
(1987) (a defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction that is an erroneous 
statement of the law, is not supported by the evidence, is an impermissible 
comment on the evidence, or is adequately covered by other instructions). 
Pina next argues, in the alternative, that the instructions did not 
adequately convey the concept of causation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 33-34.) 
However, nothing in the record indicates that Pina objected that this instruction 
was inadequate to convey the principle of causation. To the contrary, Pina 
proposed a jury instruction where the causation was expressed as a finding that 
"the murder ... occurred in the commission or attempted commission of 
kidnaping [sic]." (Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions, No. 5.) Because 
Pina did not object to the adequacy of the instructions on this ground, he must 
establish fundamental error. State v. Anderson, 144 ldaho 743, 748, 170 P.3d 
886, 891 (2007); I.C.R. 30(b). To show fundamental error the appellant has the 
burden of showing error, Anderson, 144 ldaho at 748, 170 P.3d at 891, and that 
the error was "error which so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest 
injustice and deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due process" 
State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 281, 77 P.3d 956, 970 (2003). 
The error Pina asserts in this case is not fundamental as a matter of law. 
In State v. Olin, 103 ldaho 391, 648 P.2d 203 (1982), the ldaho Supreme Court 
held that a challenge the adequacy of felony murder instructions was not 
reviewable under identical language as found in the current I.C.R. 30(b) ("No 
party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the 
party objects thereto . . . ."). 
Even if the challenge raised on appeal is not barred by law, Pina has still 
failed to show fundamental error. The instruction at issue provided that the jury 
had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that "during the commission or 
attempted commission of the kidnapping, Jesse Naranjo was killed." (Fianl [sic] 
Jury Instructions, No. 22.) Pina acknowledges, as he must, that the element of 
causation was not entirely omitted, but rather that the instruction failed to convey 
that the killing was the "direct and foreseeable consequence" of the kidnapping. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 33-34.) Because the element of causation was not 
omitted, the error claimed was not fundamental. See Anderson, 144 Idaho at 
748, 170 P.3d at 891 (omission of element of crime from instructions 
fundamental error). 
Nor has Pina shown any reasonable view of the evidence by which the 
error could be considered fundamental. Pina argues that the jury could have 
convicted even if it had concluded that (1) Pina had abandoned the kidnapping; 
(2) Naranjo's act of attacking Shores and taking the gun was an intervening 
cause; or (3) that Shores killed Naranjo out of animosity. (Appellant's brief, p. 
33.) None of these scenarios are factually or legally relevant. 
First, no reasonable view of the evidence or the law would have led to an 
acquittal on the theory that Pina abandoned the kidnapping. All of the evidence 
at trial was that he was actively trying to prevent Naranjo's escape at the time of 
the shooting. In addition, even if he had mentally (or even physically) abandoned 
the kidnapping, he would be in no different circumstances than Hokenson, who 
was actually in police custody at the time his bomb killed Officer Flavel. Even if 
the evidence supported the factual theory that Pina abandoned the kidnapping 
(which it does not), Pina had still set unlawful forces in motion by his unlawful act, 
and was responsible for their consequences. See State v. Hokenson, 96 ldaho 
283, 288, 527 P.2d 487, 492 (1974). 
Second, Pina's argument that Naranjo's acts of trying to get the gun might 
be an intervening causation is without legal merit. The argument that the acts of 
the victim trying to defend himself against the felony actually caused the death 
and therefore insulate the defendant from liability is exactly the underlying 
rationale for rejecting the agency rule in the first place. See People v. Hudson, 
856 N.E.2d 1078, 1083-84 (111. 2006) (defendant responsible for death caused by 
victim's forcible resistance to felony); Miers v. State, 251 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1952) (defendant responsible for death of victim while resisting felony). 
That a victim may forcibly resist his own kidnapping, and that death may result 
there from, are exactly the sort of foreseeable results of committing certain 
crimes to which the felony murder rule applies. 
Third, although there is evidence that Shores bore animosity to Naranjo, 
nothing in the record or the law indicates that his act of shooting Naranjo was not 
proximately caused by Pina's act of kidnapping Naranjo. Naranjo was in the 
house with Shores because Pina kidnapped him. Naranjo was killed with the 
very weapon Pina used to kidnap him. Shores' animosity to Naranjo provided a 
motive for Shores to join the kidnapping. Finally, Naranjo was killed while Pina 
was still in the act of preventing Naranjo from escaping the kidnapping. In short, 
Pina has failed to show any reasonable view of the evidence showing that 
Naranjo was not killed as a result of "unlawful forces [Pina] set in motion during 
the commission of" the kidnapping. State v. Hokenson, 96 Idaho 283, 288, 527 
P.2d 487, 492 (1974). As such, he has failed to show fundamental error in the 
jury instructions. 
Pina Has Failed To Show The District court   bused Its Discretion By Denying 
Pina's Untimely Request For Self-Representation 
A. Introduction 
After the presentation of evidence, Pina indicated that he did not wish to 
proceed with his counsel. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1617, Ls. 1-3 (jailer reported that 
Pina would appear in court only if he could represent himself); p. 1625, L. 23 - p. 
1626, L. 7 (parties resting immediately after ruling on self-representation)). The 
court heard argument from counsel, and ruled that the request for self- 
representation was untimely. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1618, L. 3 - p. 1622, L. 5.) 
Pina claims the court erred in denying the request on grounds of untimeliness, 
arguing that the court was required to conduct an investigation into the grounds 
for the request and balance those reasons against other factors. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 35-40.) This argument fails because the court was neither required to 
make further investigation, nor has Pina shown any abuse of discretion based on 
the facts before the court. 
B. Standard of Review 
An appellate court reviews a trial court's discretionary decision to deny an 
untimely request for self-representation under a three tiered inquiry: (1) whether 
the court perceived it had discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the 
boundaries of its discretion; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. State v. Reber, 138 ldaho 275, 61 P.3d 632 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(citing State v. Hedcler, 115 ldaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)). 
C. Pina Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court's Denial Of 
The Untimely Motion For Self-Representation 
Although a court has discretion to consider an untimely motion for self- 
representation, a defendant has no constitutional interest at stake in the denial of 
such a motion. State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 277-78, 61 P.3d 632, 635-36 (Ct. 
App. 2002) (and cited authority). Nevertheless, a court has discretion to grant 
the motion. Id. 
In m, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a request 
for self-representation made after several witnesses had testified because the 
timing of the motion was "inappropriate." Id. at 278, 61 P.3d at 636. Here the 
motion was made after the state had rested and the defense had presented its 
witnesses. In addition, Pina was screaming expletives, refusing to wear his 
civilian clothes, and his declared goal was to obtain a mistrial. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, 
p. 1607, L. 3 - p. 1608, L. 12.) On appeal Pina faults the trial court for failing to 
make "relevant inquiries" (Appellant's brief, p. 39), but fails to acknowledge that 
below he refused to even come before the court unless his demand for self- 
representation was met. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1617, Ls. 1-3.) The court 
specifically stated, again unacknowledged by Pina, that it understood "this is a 
discretionary call." (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1621, Ls. 5-16.) Given the timing of the 
request, the circumstances and Pina's behavior attendant the request, and the 
court's specific statement of its understanding of its discretion, Pina has failed to 
show an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Pina's conviction for 
first-degree murder 
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